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Abstract 
 
Optimal power flow (OPF) problems are focussing on the question how a power transmission 
network can be operated in the most economic way. The general aim in such scenarios is to 
optimize generator scheduling in order to meet consumption re-quirements, transmission 
constraints and to minimize the overall generation cost and transmission losses. We use a 
simple lossless DC load flow model for the description of the transmission network, and 
assume linearly decreasing marginal cost of generators with different parameters for each 
generator. We consider a scenario in which the generation values regarding the OPF are 
calculated by a central authority who is aware of the network parameters and production 
characteristics. Furthermore, we assume that a central mechanism is applied for the 
determination of generator payoffs in order to cover their generation costs and assign them 
with some profit. We analyze the situation when generators may provide false information 
about their production parameters and thus manipulate the OPF computation in order to 
potentially increase their resulting profit. We consider two central payoff mechanisms and 
compare their vulnerability for such manipulations and analyze their effect on the total social 
cost. 
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Hazug villamosenergia-termelők: a centralizált kifizetési 
mechanizmusok manipulálhatósága az 
áramkereskedelemben 
 
Csercsik Dávid 
 
Összefoglaló 
 
Az optimális teljesítményáramok (OTÁ) problémája azon kérdéssel foglalkozik, hogyan lehet 
egy villamosenergia-átviteli hálózatot a leggazdaságosabban működtetni. OTÁ problémák 
esetén a cél annak meghatározása, hogy a villamosenergia-termelés milyen értékeivel tudjuk 
kielégíteni a fogyasztók igényeit oly módon, hogy ne terheljük túl az átviteli hálózatot, 
valamint minimalizáljuk a termelési költségeket és az átviteli veszteségeket. A tanulmányban 
a hálózatot egyszerű DC load flow modellel írjuk le, valamint minden termelő esetében 
lineárisan csökkenő marginális termelési költséget tételezünk fel. Egy olyan piacot veszünk 
figyelembe, ahol az OTÁ meghatározása központi hatóság feladata, ami ismeri a hálózati és 
termelési paramétereket. Továbbá feltételezzük, hogy a villamosenergia-termelők kifizetése is 
központi mechanizmus alapján történik. Azt a lehetőséget vizsgáljuk, hogy mi történik, ha a 
termelők nem valós adatokat adnak meg, így manipulálva az OPF-számítást és potenciálisan 
növelve profitjukat. Két különböző központi kifizetési mechanizmust vizsgálunk és 
összehasonlítjuk manipulálhatóságukat. 
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Abstract
Optimal power flow (OPF) problems are focussing on the question how a power
transmission network can be operated in the most economic way. The general aim in
such scenarios is to optimize generator scheduling in order to meet consumption re-
quirements, transmission constraints and to minimize the overall generation cost and
transmission losses. We use a simple lossless DC load flow model for the description
of the transmission network, and assume linearly decreasing marginal cost of gener-
ators with different parameters for each generator. We consider a scenario in which
the generation values regarding the OPF are calculated by a central authority who
is aware of the network parameters and production characteristics. Furthermore, we
assume that a central mechanism is applied for the determination of generator payoffs
in order to cover their generation costs and assign them with some profit. We analyze
the situation when generators may provide false information about their production
parameters and thus manipulate the OPF computation in order to potentially in-
crease their resulting profit. We consider two central payoff mechanisms and compare
their vulnerability for such manipulations and analyze their effect on the total social
cost.
Keywords: Networks, manipulability, power transmission, optimal power
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1 Introduction
Because of its extreme importance, power system economics (Kirschen and Strbac, 2004)
has been an intensively researched interdisciplinary area. The trends of electricity market
liberalization, together with occasionally rapidly extending consumption in long term and
consumption peaks in short term, put increasing load on system operators and authorities
responsible for network operation and expansion.
If one wishes to analyze the electrical energy market as interactions of market partic-
ipants, he has to take into account that the possible interactions are constrained by laws
of physics as well as by market regulations.
Optimal power flow (OPF) problems (Dommel and Tinney, 1968; Conejo and Aguado,
1998) dominantly aim to optimize the system operation costs, namely minimize instan-
taneous generating costs and/or transmission losses under various assumptions, however
the objective function may be based on voltage profile or voltage stability considerations
as well (Abido, 2002). The control variables of such problems in addition to generator
production rates may include the voltage angles of the buses (Conejo and Aguado, 1998),
transformation ratios, states of flexible ac transmission systems (FACTS) (Hingorani, 1993;
Hingorani, Gyugyi, and El-Hawary, 2000; Song and Johns, 1999) which affect the trans-
mission performance of power lines, and switching variables which alter the topology of
the transmission network (Fisher, O’Neill, and Ferris, 2008; Hedman, O’Neill, Fisher, and
Oren, 2008; O’Neill, Hedman, Krall, Papavasiliou, and Oren, 2010). These optimal trans-
mission switching models, which formulate the optimization as a mixed integer problem,
usually assume n − 1 contingency reliability (Hedman, O’Neill, Fisher, and Oren, 2009)
(in general, n is the number of system components), which means that the effects of single
line and generator failures on the network are included in the analysis. The latest models
of Hedman, Ferris, O’Neill, Fisher, and Oren (2010) even include generator startup and
shutdown costs as well.
For the optimization problems resulting from different OPF scenarios, numerous so-
lution approaches have been proposed including e.g. the Newton-approach (Sun, Ashley,
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Brewer, Hughes, and Tinney, 1984), particle swarm optimization (Abido, 2002), as well
as evolutionary and genetic algorithms (Yuryevich and Wong, 1999; Bakirtzis, Biskas,
Zoumas, and Petridis, 2002). For surveys see (Momoh, Adapa, and El-Hawary, 1999;
Momoh, El-Hawary, and Adapa, 1999; Huneault and Galiana, 1991).
Our aim in this paper however is not to provide novel or more efficient methods for OPF
calculation, but to analyze the economic aspects of a regulated electricity market model,
with a fixed network topology, where the OPF calculation is carried out by a central
authority, which is considered to be independent of the generators. We will assume that
generators are obligated to provide information about their own production characteristics
to this central authority (independent network operator or INO in the following), and
investigate how possibly provided unrealistic information affects the resulting profits under
various assumptions. A further aim is to determine the effect of cooperation, which is
interpreted in this case as coordinated provision of (potentially false) information for the
INO. We assume a simple lossless DC load flow model, and linearly decreasing marginal
generation costs.
2 Materials and Methods
First, let us review the DC load flow model used for the description of the power trans-
mission network.
The DC load flow model has been widely used among papers analyzing power system
economics (see e.g. Tseng, Oren, Cheng, Li, Svoboda, and Johnson (1999); Yao, Oren,
and Adler (2004); Sauma and Oren (2007)). For the sake of simplicity we will assume
that every node of the energy transmission network is assigned to a certain generator or
consumer. The most straightforward interpretation of the model is that we study the high
voltage networks, in which case consumers correspond to local energy providers who own
mid-voltage networks.
We assume that the power transmission system is described by a graph, the system
graph, in which n nodes (or buses) are connected by m edges, which naturally represent
the transmission lines. We assume ng generators, and nc = n− ng consumers.
The details of the DC load flow model are described in Appendix A. The notations
and the mathematical formalism are based on Oren, Spiller, Varaiya, and Wu (1995) and
Contreras (1997). One of the most important properties of the DC load flow model is that
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given a power injection vector P , the network topology and line parameters, the flows (qij)
can be uniquely determined via linear equations. We assume that the first ng elements of P
correspond to generators for which the pi values are negative. Pg will denote the truncated
vector, which holds only the first ng elements of P . During the optimization process,
these elements of P will represent the decision variables, while the remaining elements
corresponding to the consumption values will be constant. Pc will denote the remaining
part of P corresponding to consumers.
In the following we itemize some additional assumptions regarding our model
• We neglect the demand elasticity of consumers.
• Each generator has a limited production capacity.
• The concept of plant utilization is important when analysing the costs of generating
electricity. It can be observed that a plant with low utilization inevitably has a high
unit cost of production because the same investment and fixed costs of operation
and maintenance are recovered over fewer units of production. As the most simple
approach, we assume that generation cost per unit is linear decreasing function of
generated quantity1: cj(pj) = aj −mjpj where aj [$/MWh] and mj > 0 [$/MWh
2]
are the constants describing the production characteristics of generator j (which
depend on the applied technology), while pj [MWh] is the total power produced
by the generator j. The total generation cost of a generator can be formulated as:
Cj = cj(pj)pj . The vector C holds the generation costs.
• The income (Ij), and so the profit (γj), of a certain generator j depends on the actual
market regulation mechanism, in other words on the applied payoff mechanism (see
later).
2.1 Calculating the optimal power flow
Let us assume that the fixed consumption needs of nodes ng + 1, ..., ng + nc are denoted
by pni (i ∈ {1, .., nc}). In our case the optimal power flow is the solution of the following
1Although it is possible that near the production capacity limits the validity of the decreasing marginal
cost assumption is questionable, to keep the model as simple as possible, we restrict our analysis to the
case where the linearly decreasing marginal cost assumption is valid. The model can be easily extended
with more complex production characteristics.
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problem.
min
Pg
ng∑
j=1
Cj(pj) (1)
subject to the constraints
|BDATB+P | < Q¯ (2)
−IngPg ≤ P¯g (3)
n∑
i=1
pi = 0 (4)
IncPc = Pn (5)
where Cj(pj) = cj(pj)pj is the generation cost of generator j. Eq. 2 corresponds to
the prevention of line flow overloads, eq. 3 describes the limited generation capacity of
generators where the vector P¯g length ng holds the maximal generation values (Ing is the
unitary matrix of size ng - remember that the P values for generators are negative), while
eqs. 4 and 5 refer to the power balance for the whole network and the fulfillment of
consumption needs respectively (the vector Pn of length nc is composed of the p
n
i values).
We will denote the optimal power injection vector, the solution of 1 with P opt.
This is a smooth nonlinear optimization problem with equality and inequality type
constraints. The absolute value from the constraint 2 may be removed as described in
(Kaltenbach and Hajdu, 1971)2. In Appendix B several available optimization methods
have been compared for the OPF calculation. Based on the results, we will use the the
SCIP algorithm (Achterberg, 2009) for OPF calculation for the rest of the paper, as it
turned out to be the most efficient.
2.2 The example network
As it can be seen in Fig. 1, the generator capacities are P¯g = [4, 5, 4, 6]
T while the con-
sumption demands are defined as Pn = [3 1 1]
T . qst can be calculated as 1.3Yst. The
2This approach doubles the number of variables in the optimization problem (since it separates the
positive and negative part of the variables).
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Figure 1: Topology and parameters of the example network. The Yst values denote the
admittance values of the line connecting node s and t. The numbers next to the nodes
indicate the available generation amounts and required consumption quantities denoted by
arrows pointing from the number to the node and vice versa respectively.
a1 a2 a3 a4 m1 m2 m3 m4
0.65 0.63 0.68 0.7 0.1 0.07 0.0 0.04
Table 1: Production parameters of the example network. Dimensions: ai [$/MWh], mi
[$/MWh2].
above parameters and the network structure was determined in order to provide a computa-
tionally tractable example, where a significant number of consumer-generator matchings is
feasible. The multiplier 1.3 was determined in order to imply real transmission constraints
on the set of possible matchings under the assumed P¯g and Pc values.
The production parameters are summarized in Table 1.
The production curves are depicted in Fig. 2.
2.3 Payoff mechanisms
We assume that after each generator reports its production parameters, the INO determines
the OPF. Thereafter the payoff of generators is calculated based on their actual production
values corresponding to the OPF. The following payoff mechanisms are considered
6
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Figure 2: Linearly decreasing marginal cost production characteristics of the various gen-
erators.
1. Unitary price - In this case, independently of the production cost, generators are
rewarded based on the produced quantity. We assume that the unitary payoff (iu)
is always high enough to cover the production costs of generators. In this case the
income of generator j may be formalized as
Ij = iupj
2. Proportional profit - As an alternative we may assume a payoff mechanism which
distinguishes between generators using different technology, and compensates higher
production costs more. This mechanism may be regarded as the most simple one
which determines the payoff according to the possibly different production charac-
teristics. In this setup each generator receives an amount, which ensures a payoff
proportional to its total generation cost. We denote the profit ratio by rP . In this
case the income of generator j can be calculated as
Ij = (1 + rP )C
calc
j
where Ccalcj is the cost of generation regarding generator j, calculated by the INO
from the reported production parameters.
In both cases the profit is calculated as the difference of the income and the real generation
cost γj = Ij − Cj. The vectors I and γ are composed of Ij and γj values.
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Let us note that the social cost (the amount that the INO pays to the generators) is
always the same in the first case but may depend on reported values in the second case.
More precisely, in the case of the proportional profit mechanism, both the increase and
decrease of the TSC (total social cost) is possible. See Example 1 later for details.
If the reference profit of the lying generator is zero (it does not generate any power), it
may report more effective production characteristics to modify the OPF to a state where
his generation value is positive, with a positive profit (which is in this case less then the
reference profit determined by the proportional profit principle).
2.4 The optimization problem of the lying generators
While the INO schedules the generators in order to reach the lowest overall production cost
taking into account the reported characteristics, generators may lie about their production
parameters to modify/maximize their payoff. As a simplest case we will assume that only
one generator (generator 1) is lying and take a close look to the implied optimization
problem.
Example 1
We compare 4 cases. Case 1 serves as reference.
1. In the reference case, when all generators report their real production parameters,
the power injection vector corresponding to the OPF, the calculated (Ccalc) and real
(C) generation costs are
P opt =


−3.0006
0
−1.9994
0
3
1
1


Ccalc =


1.05
0
1.0398
0


C =


1.05
0
1.0398
0


while, incomes and profits according to the unitary price mechanism (I1/γ2) and to
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the proportional profit mechanism (I2/γ2) are
I1 =


2.1004
0
1.3996
0


I2 =


1.7851
0
1.7676
0


γ1 =


1.0504
0
0.3598
0


γ2 =


0.7350
0
0.7278
0


2. If generator one reports the production parameters a1 = 0.65 m1 = 0.08877 instead
of his real values, the power injection vector corresponding to the OPF, the calculated
(Ccalc) and real (C) generation costs are
P opt =


−3.0006
0
−1.9994
0
3
1
1


Ccalc =


1.1511
0
1.0398
0


C =


1.05
0
1.0398
0


incomes and profits according to the unitary price mechanism (I1/γ2) and to the
proportional profit mechanism (I2/γ2) in thi case are
I1 =


2.1004
0
1.3996
0


I2 =


1.9569
0
1.7676
0


γ1 =


1.0504
0
0.3598
0


γ2 =


0.9069
0
0.7278
0


One would expect that if a "lying" generator reports higher generation costs, it will be
scheduled for a smaller power. However, as this case demonstrates, if the proportional
profit mechanism is applied, the P opt vector does not change, and so neither does I1
or γ1. On the other hand I2 and γ2 are increased. In other words using generator 1
for generation is still cheaper than changing to an other generating unit.
This case shows as well that in the case of the proportional profit mechanism, when
the reference profit of the lying generator is nonzero, it is possible that it may increase
its reported generation cost and thus increase the TSC (which may be calculated as
the sum of the elements of I2).
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3. Next we analyze what happens when generator 1 further decreases the reported value
of of m1 to m1 = 0.08876. In this case the power injection vector corresponding to
the OPF, the calculated (Ccalc) and real (C) generation costs are
P opt =


0
−3.4885
−1.5115
0
3
1
1


Ccalc =


0
1.3459
0.8450
0


C =


0
1.3459
0.8450
0


incomes and profits according to the unitary price mechanism (I1/γ2) and to the
proportional profit mechanism (I2/γ2) in thi case are
I1 =


0
2.4420
1.0580
0


I2 =


0
2.2880
1.4366
0


γ1 =


0
1.0961
0.2130
0


γ2 =


0
0.9421
0.5915
0


At this point, the calculated cost of the other power injection configuration (P opt),
where the system no longer uses generator 1 becomes lower than using generator 1,
and the operation abruptly changes to a different operating point. Generator 1 can
not lie arbitrary big to increase its profit.
4. Let us examine what happens when generator 2 reports a2 = 0.59 (while the real
value of the parameter is 0.63). In this case
P opt =


0
−3.4885
−1.5115
0
3
1
1


Ccalc =


0
1.2063
0.8450
0


C =


0
1.3459
0.8450
0


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while, incomes and profits according to the unitary price mechanism (I1/γ2) and to
the proportional profit mechanism (I2/γ2) are
I1 =


0
2.4420
1.0580
0


I2 =


0
2.0508
1.4366
0


γ1 =


0
1.0961
0.2130
0


γ2 =


0
0.7049
0.5915
0


This example demonstrates that, if assuming the proportional payoff mechanism,
generator 2 was able to change the operation point to a state where its generation is
greater than zero and thus increase its profit from zero to 0.7049, while the TSC has
been decreased from 3.5527 to 3.4874.
The above simple example shows that the objective function of the generators opti-
mization problem is non-continuous (the implied profit may change abruptly). To study
which nonlinear solver suits the best to this type of problem, a series of simulation studies
were performed.
2.5 Optimization methods for the lying generators
In this subsection we use the same randomization of the network and production charac-
teristics during the simulations like in Appendix A, and compare the efficiency of various
optimization algorithms regarding lying. We assume that only player one is lying. Further-
more, we assumed that the lying of the generators is credible only if the reported values
stay in ±20% interval of the real values.
The set of the compared algorithms is slightly different. The computations were carried
out in MATLAB. Regarding the SCIP algorithm used in the OPF calculation, SCIP only
supports a subset of MATLAB commands, and the objective function to be minimized
includes an OPF calculation (in other words an ’inner’ optimization process is required
to determine the value of the objective function), this method can not be used in this
case. The IPOPT and L-BFGS-B methods used for the comparison of solvers for the OPF
calculation are designed for continuous, differentiable objective functions, and since in this
case the objective function is discontinuous, they have to be discarded. The solver NLOPT
ran into numerical problems from time to time. The reason for this probably lies in the
non-continuous nature of the optimization problem.
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On the other hand three algorithms were added to the test set, which were unable to
handle the optimal flow problem because of the nature of constraints, but here they proved
to be useful.
• Particle swarm (PS) pattern search method (Vaz and Vicente, 2007).
• Simulated annealing (SA) (van Laarhoven and Aarts, 2008) (SA), as implemented in
the MATLAB function simulannealbnd
• Nomad (Le Digabel, 2011).
100 repeated runs were completed with each algorithm and each payoff mechanism.
Table 2 holds the accumulated surplus value regarding each algorithm compared to the
reference case (real parameters reported). Regarding the unitary price payoff mechanism
the unitary price was set to 0.7 to ensure positive profit for each generator. In the propor-
tional profit payoff mechanism, the value rP = 0.1 was used for profit ratio.
Payoff mech. FILTER NOMAD PSWARM GA SA
1 0 0.14 0.27 0.26 0.28
2 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.25
Table 2: The result of optimization regarding lying in the case of various optimization
methods and payoff mechanisms: Increase of the resulting profit due to lying. Player 1 is
lying. Averaged results of 100 simulations.
The comparison of the resulting profit makes sense regarding a given payoff mechanism
only, since the base profits are different when considering different payoff mechanisms.
In the case of unitary pricing (1), only the NOMAD, PSWARM, SA and GA algorithms
were able to improve the profit in 19, 39, 39 and 42 % of the cases respectively, while in
the case of the proportional profit payoff mechanism, the optimization methods brought
improvement compared to the reference non-lying case in 75, 77, 78, 75 and 79 % of
the cases respectively. In the case of unitary pricing, the FILTER algorithm was not
able to improve the results (lying based on this optimization method did not bring any
significant benefit to the lying generator). This example points toward the hypothesis that
the proportional profit mechanism is more easy to manipulate, and the simulated annealing
mechanism is the most efficient in both cases. Regarding both cases of payoff mechanism,
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simulated annealing (SA) (van Laarhoven and Aarts, 2008) provided the best results for
the analyzed optimization problem, and so in the rest of the paper we will use this method
for the determination of the reported production values of generators when lying.
It is straightforward to do the analysis in the cases when not player one, but one of
the other players is lying to see how the results depend on production characteristics and
position in the network. If only player 2 is lying (determining the reported values with SA),
the lying helps him to improve his profit in 46 and 79 % considering unitary pricing and
proportional profit payoff mechanisms respectively. The values are 46 and 79 % respectively
considering player 3, and 42 and 62 in the case of player 4.
Regarding the effect of the proportional profit payoff mechanism on the TSC, the sign of
the change in the TSC due to lying strongly depends on the real production characteristics
of the player. If a generator has an efficient production capability, it will be chosen with
greater chance for production, even if the real values are reported. In this case, as discussed
in 2.3 the TSC will increase. Simulation results show that in the case of player one lying,
the TSC increased in 60% of the cases while decreased in 24% (in the rest of the cases it did
not practically change). In the case of player 2 these values are 46% and 26%. Regarding
player 3 we get 58% and 32%, while in the case of player 4 the vales are 42% and 22%
respectively. The results are in good agreement of what we expect from the production
characteristics and the hypothesis detailed in section 2.3. As Fig. 2 shows, player 1 has
the most efficient production characteristics. This implies that he is often included in the
basic (not lying) OPF setup. In these cases his base production is greater than zero, and
with false reports he may keep his production demand, while increasing his profit and the
TSC as well. In contrast, in the player 4 with the less efficient production curve has this
opportunity in much smaller percent of the cases.
3 Conclusions
Based on a conventional DC load flow model we analyzed a simple model of a centrally
regulated electrical power market. In the proposed model the INO calculates the optimal
power flow and determines the generation values according to the production characteristics
reported by the generators. The generators are paid according to two different payoff
mechanisms - the unitary price and the proportional profit mechanism. We assumed that
generators may report false values to manipulate the INOs decision and thus increase their
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profit. While the profit mechanism can be considered more fair, since it takes into account
the different production characteristics while determining the payoffs, simulations shown
that this mechanism is more easy to manipulate by the proposed lying actions. Regarding
the analyzed example, the proportional profit mechanism indicated a significant potential
to increase the TSC when a lying generator is present. In addition the efficiency of different
numerical optimization algorithms were compared both for the OPF and the lying problem.
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Appendix A: DC Load flow model
In the proposed model generators can be characterized by the quantity of actual and
maximal generated (or supplied) power, while consumers are described by their power
consumption (constant for each consumer node). We assume that a transmission line is
characterized by its admittance value, denoted by Yij (which will be equal to susceptance
in this case, for we neglect the real part of impedance values), and maximum transmission
capacity (or branch power flow limit) q¯ij .
According to our modelling considerations, we describe the voltage at node i with
sinusoidal waveform:
vi(t) = Vi sin(ωt+ θi) (6)
where Vi stands for the magnitude, ω = 2pif denotes the frequency in rad/s and θi is the
phase angle.
If we assume that the nodes i and j are connected by a transmission line with admittance
Yij = Yji, the (real) power flow from i to j can be described with:
qij = ViVjYij sin(θi − θj) (7)
By definition qij > 0 if the power flows from i to j. This implies qij = −qji for flows of
opposite direction. We can formalize the energy conservation for each node as follows. The
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net power pi injected into (or drawn from) the network at bus i addition to the total inflow
is equal to the total outflow:
pi =
n∑
j=1
qij (8)
Without the loss of generality, let us assume Vi ≡ 1. In this case
pi =
n∑
j=1
Yij sin(θi − θj) (9)
which means n− 1 independent equations (as p1 + ...+ pn = 0). Let us choose θn
.
= 0. In
this case the individual line flows can be expressed as:
qij = Yij sin(θi − θj) (10)
Assuming that (θi− θj) is small, sin(x) may be approximated with x. This leads to the
so called "DC load flow model", which exhibits the following uniqueness property: Given
power injections and power consumptions at each node, the phase angles θi are determined
by solving a system of linear equations. From the phase angle differences, the line flows
can be uniquely determined.
We can summarize the equations in the following matrix formalism (Contreras, 1997):
The relation between the total inlet/outlet power and power flows can be described by
AQ = P (11)
where A ∈ Rn×m is the Node-branch incidence matrix of the network, Q ∈ Rm denotes the
power flow vector, and P ∈ Rn is the power injection vector (composed of [p1, p2, ..., pn]).
If we substitute the individual power flows in Equation 11 with the linearized expressions
from Equation 7, we can write
B(Y )Θ = P (12)
where B(Y ) ∈ Rn×n denotes the susceptance matrix whose elements are Bkl = −Ykl for
the off-diagonal terms and
Bkk =
∑
k 6=l
Bkl
(the column sum of off-diagonals) for diagonal elements. Θ ∈ Rn is vector of nodal voltage
angles.
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The constraint describing the maximum line power flows can be derived as
|Q| = |BDATΘ| < Q¯ (13)
where |Q¯| is branch power flow limit vector (composed of the elements q¯ij), and B
D is a
diagonal matrix with BDkk = Yij.
As we know from Equation 12, BΘ = P . The matrix B is singular due to the column
conservation property, but since in the calculation of flows only the differences of the
elements of the vector Θ are appearing (see Equation 7), we may express it as
Θ = B+P (14)
where B+ is the Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse of B. Constraint 13 becomes
|BDATΘ| = |BDATB+P | < Q¯ (15)
Appendix B: Optimization methods for the OPF
As a preliminary study we compared the currently freely available optimization tools in
MATLAB in the context of solving 1-5. The basic model was the topology of Network 1
as depicted in Fig 1, however the admittance values, and production characteristics were
randomized around the nominal values described in section 2.2 as follows. Y˜ij = Yij +∆Y
where ∆Y ∈ (−0.5, 0.5) , a˜j = aj + ∆a where ∆a ∈ (−0.25, 0.25), and m˜j = mj + ∆m
where ∆m ∈ (−0.03, 0.03) (each ∆ value from uniform distribution).
The following algorithms were compared:
• Interior point optimizer (IPOPT), see (Wächter and Biegler, 2006)
• Filter–SQP Algorithm (Fletcher, Leyffer, and Toint, 2002)
• L-BFGS-B or Algorithm 778 (Zhu, Byrd, Lu, and Nocedal, 1997)
• NLOPT (Johnson, 2010)
• SCIP (Achterberg, 2009)
• The standard genetic algorithm (GA) of MATLAB (Goldberg and Holland, 1988)
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1000 repeated runs were completed with the randomized parameters for each algorithm
A. The evaluation was carried out as follows. For each run, the reference value of the
objective function F (the value of 1) at run i denoted by Fref(i) was defined as the lowest
value found by the various algorithms in the current run Fref(i) = minA FA(i)). The error
of the algorithm A at run i (ΥA(i)) then is defined as
ΥA(i) = FA(i)− Fref(i)
The resulting error is the sum over the repetitive runs ΥA =
∑
iΥA(i). The resulting
values are as follows.
Payoff mech. IPOPT FILTER L-BFGS-B NLOPT SCIP GA
Υ 74.6 122.3 74.6 1044.1 2 882
Table 3: Comparison of various optimization methods regarding optimal power flow com-
putation .
As it can be seen from the results summarized in 3, the SCIP algorithm finds the best
value of the objective function in almost every case, and it is undoubtedly the most well
suited for this optimization problem.
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